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Computing a Data Dividend
ERIC BAX
Quality data is a fundamental contributor to success in statistics and machine learning. If a statistical assess-
ment or machine learning leads to decisions that create value, then data contributorsmay want a share of that
value. This paper presents methods to assess the value of individual data samples, and of sets of samples, to
apportion value among different data contributors. We use Shapley values for individual samples and Owen
values for combined samples, and we show that these values can be computed in polynomial time in spite of
their definitions having numbers of terms that are exponential in the number of samples.
ACM Economics & Computation 2019 (EC ’19) – Poster Presentation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many organizations utilize data about individuals to perform various functions. In many cases,
this involves analyzing data that is aggregated over many people, to make decisions that lead to
actions that generate profits or losses. Search, email, and social media providers’ use of their users’
data to select advertisements to show their users [16, 23, 37] (often in exchange for providing their
services free of charge) has prompted calls for users to be paid a data dividend [5] – a portion
of the profits generated using their data. This paper details methods to compute a data dividend,
either on a sample-by-sample basis or for a collection of data that forms part of the data set used
to make decisions.
Themethods presented in this paper apply to data dividends for profits derived from advertising
to users and also to data dividends for other ways of generating profits from data. Search, email,
and social media providers can, and in some cases do, generate profits from data through methods
other than advertising. Examples include using aggregate email data, such as emailed receipts for
purchases, as input to buy-sell decisions in equity markets [32, 35, 36] or for market research
[20, 21] that can support such decisions. Similarly, aggregated search and social media data can
be analyzed to make effective economic forecasts [14, 18, 27], which can also support buy-sell
decisions, leading to profits or losses.
Other types of organizations also derive benefits from aggregated data. Insurance companies
use aggregated data to set rates, and medical organizations use it (often on a smaller scale) for
clinical trials and to predict disease outbreaks (a function that can benefit from search, email, and
social media data as well [4, 19]). Many retailers use customer relationship management (CRM)
systems to automatically determine which offers to extend to which customers, based on analysis
of data aggregated over customers. In Iceland, individuals’ medical, genetic, and genealogical data
have been aggregated for use in development of medical products as well as for anthropological
discoveries [1, 15, 17, 30].
Organizations may argue that individuals or groups who provide data are already compensated
adequately, because they receive services in exchange for their data. However, increasingly, users
are becoming concerned with data privacy, as evidenced by legal changes such as the GDPR [2]
in the European Union, congressional hearings on how internet-based companies use user data in
the United States, and even comments by Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, on behalf of users of Apple
devices, in favor of giving users more control over and awareness about how their data is used
[31]. As users learn more about privacy issues, they are beginning to understand that their data
drives value, and they may soon begin to insist on receiving a share of that value.
The methods to compute data dividends presented in this paper are based on the idea that some
data may be more valuable than other data for making decisions that drive profits. So the methods
are based on concepts from economic mechanism design [22, 24–26] that were designed to reward
members or subgroups of coalitions for the value that they contribute to their coalitions. The
concepts include Shapley values [34] to compute values for individual samples of data and Owen
values [29] to compute the share of gains or losses to allocate to each contributor of multiple
samples.
Sections 2 and 3 offer brief reviews of Shapley and Owen values and of some basic results regard-
ing permutations that we will use for derviations in later sections. Section 4 describes methods to
compute data dividends for decision processes that rely on frequency-based analysis, for example
deciding whether to take an action based on average outcomes for similar actions under similar
circumstances in the past. Section 5 presents methods to compute data dividends for decision pro-
cesses that use nearest-neighbor models for analysis – models that employ voting over samples
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to decide which action to take. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of potential areas of interest
for future work.
2 REVIEW: SHAPLEY VALUES AND OWEN VALUES
We will use Shapley values [34] to value the contribution of individual data examples and Owen
values [29] to value the contribution of sets of examples. So we first review these values. Both
involve averages over a number of terms that is exponential in the number of participants, but our
methods will collect terms so that computation is feasible.
Imagine that a group of participants will work together to generate some value. How should we
reward each of them? One idea is to award them in the order that they agree to join the effort, and
give them the marginal value they generate by joining. However, this may lead to an impasse. For
example, if we value a completed jigsaw puzzle but have no value for a partially completed one,
then we would only award whoever places the last piece. So no one would have an incentive to
put the first two pieces together, or to do any work on the puzzle to get to having just one piece
left to fit. Even if they did, everyone would be surreptitiously hiding pieces in an attempt to have
the last one. If you have had this happen to you, then you will understand the problem.
To avoid that type of problem, Shapley’s insight was to derive the value for a participant by
averaging over all possible orders in which the participants could have decided to participate. In
each ordering, we assess the marginal contribution of the participant should they decide to join
after the participants that are before them in the ordering and before the participants that are
after them in the ordering. In the case of doing a puzzle together, each piece comes last in an equal
number of the permutations of puzzle pieces: forn pieces, (n−1)!, which is 1
n
of then! permutations.
So each piece has an equal Shapley value, which is the value of completing the puzzle divided by
the number of pieces.
A general equation for the Shapley value for participant i is:
Eσ ∈P [v(Si (σ ) ∪ {i}) − v(Si (σ ))], (1)
where P is the set of permutations of 1, . . . ,n for n participants, σ denotes permutations, Si (σ ) is
the set of entries before i in σ , and v(S) is the value if the participants indexed by S all participate,
and the others do not.
Sometimes groups of participants form coalitions, and each coalitions decides as a groupwhether
to participate. Owen values address this challenge by averaging over permutations of coalitions
and, within the participant’s coalition, over fellow coalition members. This gives a value for each
participant, and the value for a coalition is the sum of its participants’ values. Letm be the number
of coalitions, and letC1, . . . ,Cm be the sets of participant indices in the coalitions. Then the Owen
value for participant i in coalition h is:
EσC ∈PCEσh ∈Ph
[
v
(
∪j∈Sh (σC )Cj ∪ Si (σh) ∪ {i}
)
− v
(
∪j∈Sh (σC )Cj ∪ Si (σh)
)]
, (2)
where PC is the set of permutations of 1, . . . ,m; Sh(σC ) is the set of entries before h in permutation
σC ; Ph is the set of permutations of the participant indices in Ch , and Si (σh) is the set of indices
before i in σh . Continuing the jigsaw puzzle example, if each person helping put together the
puzzle first attaches a set of pieces to each other to form a region of the puzzle, then the regions
are joined together, then the Owen value for a piece is the expectation, over permutations of the
regions paired with permutations of the pieces within that piece’s region, of the marginal value
produced if that piece is added to the combination of the regions before its region in the inter-
region permutation and the pieces before it in the intra-region permutation. The Owen value for
the coalition is the sum of the Owen values over its participants. In the puzzle case, the Owen
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value for each person putting together the puzzle is the sum of the Owen values for the pieces in
their region.
3 SOME USEFUL LEMMAS ON PERMUTATIONS
Since Shapley values and Owen values are expectations over permutations, computing them effi-
ciently will require gathering terms over permutations. We will use the following two lemmas to
prove results about gathering those terms. (A note on notation: we will say "a permutation of S ,"
where S is a set, to mean a permutation of the elements of S .)
Lemma 3.1. For T ⊆ S , each permutation of T is the ordering of the elements of T in an equal
number of the permutations of S .
Proof. For each pair of permutations ofT , there is a one-to-onemapping between permutations
of S with the elements of T ordered according to the first permutation in the pair and those with
the elements ofT ordered according to the second: remove the elements ofT , then re-insert them
into the same set of positions, but in the order given by the second permutation in the pair. 
Lemma 3.2. Let S1, . . . , Sm bem disjoint sets, none of which contain element i . Let t = |S1∪. . .∪Sm∪
{i}|. Let s1, . . . , sm be integers with 0 ≤ s1 ≤ |S1 |, . . . , 0 ≤ sm ≤ |Sm |. Let u = s1 + . . . + sm . Then the
probability that a permutation drawn uniformly at random from the permutations of S1∪. . .∪Sm∪{i}
has element i preceded by exactly s1 elements of S1, . . . , and sm elements of Sm is
1
t
(
t − 1
u
)−1 (
|S1 |
s1
)
· · ·
(
|Sm |
sm
)
.
Proof. For a specific set of u elements, consisting of s1 from S1, . . . , and sm from Sm , there are
u! ways to order them in the first u positions of a permutation, a single (1!) way to place element
i in position u + 1, and (t − (u + 1))! ways to order the remaining elements in the last t − (u + 1)
positions. So the probability of that specific set of u elements preceding i is
u!1!(t − (u + 1))!
t !
=
1
t
u!(t − 1 − u)!
(t − 1)!
=
1
t
(
t − 1
u
)−1
.
The number of specific sets of u elements consisting of s1 from S1, . . . , sm from Sm is(
|S1 |
s1
)
· · ·
(
|Sm |
sm
)
.

Lemma 3.3. ForT ⊂ S and any element in S −T , equal numbers of the permutations of S have the
element preceded by 0, 1, . . . , |T | elements of |T |.
Proof. Let e be any element in S −T . Among the permutations ofT ∪{e}, e is in each position 1
to |T | + 1 for an equal number of permutations, because with e in a position, there are |T |! ways to
arrange the elements ofT in the remaining |T | positions. But the position of e in a permutation of
T ∪{e} is one greater than the number of elements that precede e , so that number is each of 0 to |T |
for an equal number of permutations ofT ∪ {e}. It only remains to show that each permutation of
T ∪ {e} is the ordering of its elements in an equal number of permutations of S . But that is Lemma
3.1, with T ∪ {e} as T . 
The first lemma implies that if we select a permutation of S at random, then the ordering of
the elements of T within the permutation is equally likely to be each permutation of T . The sec-
ond lemma offers a way to compute the probability over permutations that a specific element is
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preceded by specified numbers of elements from different sets. The third lemma implies that we
can build a random permutation of S by starting with a single element, then, for each remaining
element, select an insert position uniformly at random from: before the first entry, between the
first and second, between the second and third, ..., after the last.
A note on notation before we proceed to the main results: for combinations, let
(a
b
)
be zero if
b < 0 or b > a. This will avoid the need for complex bound-checking in summations that have
combinations in their terms.
4 FREQUENCY-BASED DECISION MAKING
Assume that there is a set of in-sample examples, each with an input and a label. Then, for each
of a set or series of out-of-sample inputs, the in-sample examples are used to generate outputs,
based on statistics or machine learning. Each output, which may be a classification, decision, or
score, leads to some action, which has some value. The value of an action may be positive, zero, or
negative. In general, the value of an action is not known when the action is taken. However, we
assume that each action’s value can be assessed later, when valuing contributions of data providers.
We also assume that we can assess values for actions not taken.
By frequency-based decision-making, we mean a process that, when supplied with an out-of-
sample input, identifies which of a set of pre-defined bins contains it, then generates an output
based solely on the frequencies of labels over in-sample examples in that bin. In other words, if
two different sets of in-sample examples have the same frequencies over labels in a bin, then they
generate the same outputs for all out-of-sample inputs in that bin.
Perhaps the simplest frequency-based decision-making process is to have a single, universal bin
and label each out-of-sample input with the most common label among the in-sample examples.
More complex bin schemes include histograms [11] (Section 6.4) and trees to divide the input space
into multiple bins in different ways. More complex decision-making methods or scoring functions
abound. They include producing no label unless the frequencies meet some standard of statistical
significance, producing a lower or upper confidence bound on the probability of a label given the
frequencies, producing a Bayesian estimate of the probability of a label given the frequencies and
a prior, producing a smoothed output such as a sigmoid applied to the relative frequency of a
label, or producing the output of an estimation procedure based on the relative frequency and the
number of samples. (For details on estimation procedures, refer to [3, 7, 8, 33, 38].)
4.1 Shapley Values for Examples
Let x be an out-of-sample input, and let y be its label. (Note that y is unknown at decision and
action time, but becomes known before we allocate value to the in-sample examples.) We will
derive Shapley values for each in-sample example in the same bin as x . The value for examples
outside the bin is zero. To produce a Shapley value for an in-sample example used for multiple
out-of-sample examples, sum the Shapley values over the out-of-sample examples.
Let n be the number of in-sample examples in the same bin as x . Let 1, . . . ,n index the in-sample
examples in the same bin as x . For simplicity and clarity, focus on binary classification. (For more
than two label values, the concepts are the same, but the notation is unwieldy.) For each example
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, let a(i) = 1 and b(i) = 0 if the label of example i equals y, and a(i) = 0 and b(i) = 1
otherwise. LetA be the set of indices of in-sample examples in the same bin as x , excluding example
i , that have label equal to y (i.e. the same label as x ). Let B be the set of indices of examples in the
same bin as x , excluding example i , that have a different label than y.
Let v(a,b) be the value of the action based on x , given the output that would result if the in-
sample examples in the same bin as x included exactly a examples that have labely and b examples
that do not. Let∆iv(a,b) be the change in value from adding example i to the bin, given that |A| = a
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and |B | = b:
∆iv(a,b) = v(a + a(i),b + b(i)) −v(a,b).
Let R be the set of (a,b) pairs for which adding example i changes the value:
R = {(a,b)|∆iv(a,b) , 0}.
Call R the critical set.
Theorem 4.1. The Shapley value for example i on out-of-sample input x with label y is:∑
(a,b )∈R
1
n
(
n − 1
a + b
)−1 (
|A|
a
) (
|B |
b
)
∆iv(a,b).
Proof. Begin with Expression 1, the general equation for a Shapley value from Section 2. The
values v(Si (σ )) and v(Si (σ ) ∪ {i}) are only affected by in-sample examples in the same bin as x .
By Lemma 3.1, the same number of permutations of all examples contain each ordering of those
n examples. So average over the n! permutations of those examples instead of the permutations
of all in-sample examples. By Lemma 3.2 the probability that a indices from A and b from B come
before i is
1
n
(
n − 1
a + b
)−1 (
|A|
a
) (
|B |
b
)
.
Given that this occurs,
∆iv(a,b) = v(Si (σ ) ∪ {i}) − v(Si (σ )).
Restricting the sum to terms with (a,b) ∈ R only avoids terms with ∆iv(a,b) = 0, so it has no
impact on the sum. 
As a simple example, suppose we use a single bin that includes all in-sample examples, a classi-
fication rule that outputs the majority label and has no output if there is no majority, and a value
function that is 100 if the classification is correct, -500 if incorrect, and zero if there is no output.
Suppose example i has label y. If a = b, then adding example i to a bin with a examples with label
y and b without turns no output into a correct classification. Similarly, if a = b − 1, then adding ex-
ample i changes from incorrect classification to no output. So R = {(a,b)|a = b}∪{(a,b)|a = b−1},
and the Shapley value for example i is:
100
n
∑
{(a,b ) |a=b }
(
n − 1
a + b
)−1 (
|A|
a
) (
|B |
b
)
+
500
n
∑
{(a,b ) |a=b−1}
(
n − 1
a + b
)−1 (
|A|
a
) (
|B |
b
)
.
Alternatively, if example i does not have label y, then adding it creates a tie from a correct classi-
fication if a = b + 1, for a loss of 100, and creates an incorrect classification from a tie if a = b, for
a loss of 500. So the Shapley value is:
−
100
n
∑
{(a,b ) |a=b+1}
(
n − 1
a + b
)−1 (
|A|
a
) (
|B |
b
)
−
500
n
∑
{(a,b ) |a=b }
(
n − 1
a + b
)−1 (
|A|
a
) (
|B |
b
)
.
The Shapley values are the same for all in-sample examples in the same bin and with the same
label. Also, the Shapley values for each in-sample example are the same for all out-of-sample
examples in the same bin and with the same label. So computing the Shapley values for all in-
sample examples over a set of out-of-sample examples requires only computing the Shapley values
for any in-sample example in each bin with each label for an out-of-sample example in each bin
with each label – four different Shapley value computations per bin, one for each combination of
in-sample label and out-of-sample label.
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4.2 Owen Values for Sets of Examples
Suppose that a set of coalitions (for example, data-gathering organizations) each contribute subsets
of the examples for the in-sample set. Let m be the number of coalitions, and let C1, . . . ,Cm be
the sets of indices of the (within-bin) in-sample examples contributed by each coalition. We will
compute Owen values for each in-sample example, for the value of a decision and action on an
out-of-sample example x with label y. (The label is unknown at decision time, but we assume that
it is known at the time that data values are computed.) The Owen value for an in-sample example
over a set of out-of-sample examples is the sum of Owen values for each out-of-sample example.
The Owen value for a coalition is the sum of Owen values over the in-sample examples that the
coalition contributes.
Owen values are nested expectations, over permutations of coalitions and permutations of in-
sample examples within each coalition. We will use dynamic programming to account for per-
mutations over coalitions, then use the results from the previous section for permutations over
examples within each coalition. To make the notation simpler, assume that we are computing the
Owen value for an example in coalitionm, the last coalition. (For the others, we can simply reorder
the indices of the coalitions to make the coalition of interest become coalitionm.)
Let pj,s,a,b be the probability that a random permutation of the coalitions places s of the coali-
tions C1, . . . ,Cj before Cm and the others after, and those s coalitions collectively contribute a
in-samples examples with label y and b examples with the other label. Then, by definition, base
case values are:
p0,0,0,0 = 1
and
∀(s,a,b) , (0, 0, 0) : p0,s,a,b = 0.
And the following recurrence holds:
Lemma 4.2. Let aj be the number of in-sample examples indexed byCj that have label y and let bj
be the number that do not. Then
pj,s,a,b =
s + 1
j + 1
pj−1,s−1,a−aj,b−bj +
j − s
j + 1
pj−1,s,a,b .
Proof. The first term accounts for Cj preceding Cm in the permutation of coalitions, and the
second term accounts forCj followingCm . From Lemma 3.3, among all permutations ofC1, . . . ,Cm ,
Cj is equally likely to be preceded by each number from 0 to j + 1 of the coalitionsC1, . . .Cj−1 and
Cm . If s of C1, . . . ,Cj−1 come beforeCm , then Cj comes before Cm too if s or fewer of C1, . . . ,Cj−1
and Cm precedeCj . From 0 to s is s + 1 possibilities, so the probability that Cj comes beforeCm is
s+1
j+1 . The probability that it comes after is 1 −
s+1
j+1 =
j−s
j+1 . 
Theorem 4.3. Let
pa,b =
m−1∑
s=0
pm−1,s,a,b .
Then the Owen value for in-sample example i contributed by coalition Cm on out-of-sample input x
with label y is:∑
(a,b )∈R
∑
(a′,b ′) |a′≤a,b ′≤b
pa−a′,b−b ′
1
|Cm |
(
|Cm | − 1
|Am | + |Bm |
)−1 (
|Am |
a′
) (
|Bm |
b ′
)
∆i (a,b),
where Am is the set of examples indexed byCm , excluding example i , that have label y, and Bm is the
set that do not.
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Proof. Recall the definition of the Owen value from Expression 2 in Section 2 (with h = m for
us). By Lemma 4.2, pa−a′,b−b ′ is the probability over permutations of coalitions that the coalitions
preceding Cm in a permutation contribute a − a′ within-bin in-sample examples with label y and
b−b ′without. By Lemma 3.1 we can take the inner average over only permutations of the elements
of Cm , ignoring any out-of-bin examples. By Lemma 3.2, the probability that the indices of a′ of
those examples with label y, and b ′ without, precede i is
1
|Cm |
(
|Cm | − 1
|Am | + |Bm |
)−1 (
|Am |
a′
) (
|Bm |
b ′
)
.
So the product is the probability that the preceding coalitions and examples from Cm preceding i
together contribute a examples with label y and b without. For expectation, we need probability
times value, and ∆i (a,b) is the marginal value from adding example i . Finally, the summation over
R only leaves out zero-value terms. 
Within each coalition, in-sample examples in the same bin and with the same label have the
same Owen value. Also, for each in-sample example, the Owen values are the same for all out-
of-sample examples in the same bin and with the same label. So computing Owen values for all
in-sample examples over a set of out-of-sample examples requires only computing the Owen value
for each combination of coalition, bin, in-sample label, and out-of-sample label.
5 NEAREST-NEIGHBOR CLASSIFIERS
To classify each out-of-sample input x , a k-nearest neighbor (k-nn) classifier [9–11, 13] first identi-
fies the k nearest neighbors, which are the in-sample examples with inputs closest to x according
to some metric. Then the classifier outputs the label shared by the majority of the k nearest neigh-
bors. We assume k is odd and binary classification, so no ties in voting. Also, we assume the metric
has consistent tie-breaking, in order to have consistent neighbors for the same x . To make a metric
meet this condition with probability one, augment each input with a real number, and in case of a
distance tie, use the distance between those real numbers to settle the tie [12]. Note that the metric
can be any function that takes two example inputs and returns a number – the metric need not
follow the triangle inequality and need not be symmetric.
5.1 Shapley Values for k-Nearest Neighbors
Let n be the number of in-sample examples. Refer to in-sample examples by indices 1 to n. To
compute the Shapley value for example i in the classification of out-of-sample input x with actual
labely, note that adding example i to a set of in-sample examples indexed by S can affect the value
in two different ways: (1) if S has k − 1 examples, then adding example i makes a vote among k
examples possible, and (2) if S has k or more examples, then adding example i may displace one of
the k nearest neighbors from S , which may change the vote. We will handle these cases separately.
For case (1), assume that the k-nn classifier makes no decision if it has fewer than k in-sample
examples. Let vn be the value if there is no decision. Let vc be the value of a correct classification,
and let vw be the value of an incorrect one. If |S | = k − 1, then v(S) = vn . Also, v(S ∪ {i}) = vc if
the majority of the labels on examples indexed by S ∪ {i} are y, and v(S ∪ {i}) = vw otherwise.
Lemma 5.1. Let yi be the label of example i , let indicator function I () be one if its argument is true
and zero otherwise, and let A index the in-sample examples, excluding example i , that have label y.
Then the contribution to the Shapley value for example i creating a classification of out-of-sample
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input x with label y is:
fi (x ,y) =
1
n
(
n − 1
k − 1
)−1 
k−1
2
−I (yi=y)∑
a=0
(
|A|
a
) (
n − 1 − |A|
k − 1 − a
)
vw +
k−1∑
a= k−1
2
−I (yi=y)+1
(
|A|
a
) (
n − 1 − |A|
k − 1 − a
)
vc

−
vn
n
.
Proof. The fraction of permutations with i in position k is 1
n
, by symmetry. For those permuta-
tions, each set of k − 1 of the n− 1 other examples is equally common as the first k − 1 examples in
the permutation. Sets of k − 1 examples with k−12 − I (yi = y) or fewer examples with label y have
a majority of labels not equal to y once example i is included to make k votes, so v(S ∪ {i}) = vw .
Those with more examples with label y result in correct classification, so v(S ∪ {i}) = vc . In both
cases, we must subtract v(S) = vn . 
For case (2), let example j be the kth nearest neighbor to x in S . (We will say an example is in
S to denote that its index is in S .) If example i is closer to x than example j is, then example i
displaces example j as a voter, which may alter the classifier’s decision. Adding i to S changes the
classification if and only if all these conditions hold:
• Example i is nearer to x than example j is, so that example i replaces example j as a voter.
• Example i has a different label than example j , so they vote differently.
• Exactly half the k − 1 nearest neighbors to x in S have label y, so example i changes the
majority vote.
If adding example i meets these conditions and example i has label y, then v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) =
vc − vw , because adding i corrects an incorrect classification. If it meets the conditions and does
not have label y, then v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = vw −vc .
Lemma 5.2. Let J index the in-sample examples that have a different label than example i and a
greater distance to x . If example i has label y, then let ∆iv = vc −vw ; otherwise let ∆iv = vw −vc . Let
Aj index the in-sample examples, excluding example i , that are closer to x than example j and have
label y. Let Bj index those that do not have label y. Then the Shapley value for example i changing
the classification of out-of-sample input x with label y is:
дi (x ,y) =
∑
j∈J
1
|Aj | + |Bj | + 2
(
|Aj | + |Bj | + 1
k
)−1 (|Aj |
k−1
2
) (
|Bj |
k−1
2
)
∆iv .
Proof. Summation over J is needed to ensure the first two conditions for example i to change
the outcome of the vote. The marginal value ∆iv is the correct value for changing the vote. By
Lemma 3.1, for each j , we can average over permutations of just Aj ∪ Bj ∪ {j} ∪ {i} rather than
all in-sample examples. For the probability that a permutation has exactly k−12 of the indices in Aj ,
exactly k−12 of the indices in Bj , and j all preceding i , apply Lemma 3.2, with S1 = Aj , S2 = Bj , and
S3 = {j}:
1
|Aj | + |Bj | + 2
(
|Aj | + |Bj | + 1
k
)−1 (|Aj |
k−1
2
) (
|Bj |
k−1
2
) (
1
1
)
.
=
1
|Aj | + |Bj | + 2
(
|Aj | + |Bj | + 1
k
)−1 (|Aj |
k−1
2
) (
|Bj |
k−1
2
)
.

Theorem 5.3. The Shapley value for example i in the classification of out-of-sample input x with
label y is:
fi (x ,y) + дi (x ,y).
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Proof. Combine Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2. 
Now consider how to compute the formula in Theorem 5.3 for all in-sample examples. The terms
of fi (x ,y) are easy to compute, because they have the same values for all examples that have the
same label, they are sums over k or fewer terms, and the only computation over multiple examples
is to determine how many examples have the same label as y.
For дi (x ,y), to simplify notation, assume that examples are numbered in order of how near they
are to x . In other words, assume example 1 is the closest to x , example 2 is the second closest, and
so forth. Let aj be the number of examples closer to x than example j that have label y. Then
|Aj | = aj − I (yi = y),
because aj excludes example i . Similarly, letbj be the number of examples closer to x than example
j that do not have label y. Then
|Bj | = bj − I (yi , y).
Since yi = y or yi , y,
|Aj | + |Bj | = aj + bj − 1.
For each out-of-sample example (x ,y), compute values aj and bj using the recurrence:
a1 = b1 = 0,
aj = aj−1 + I (yj−1 = y),
and
bj = bj−1 + I (yj−1 , y).
Note that дi (x ,y) is equal to
si ≡
n∑
j=i+1
I (yj , yi )
1
aj + bj + 1
(
aj + bj
k
)−1 (aj − I (yi = y)
k−1
2
) (
bj − I (yi , y)
k−1
2
)
∆iv .
For each label value u, let
si,u ≡
n∑
j=i+1
I (yj , u)
1
aj + bj + 1
(
aj + bj
k
)−1 (aj − I (u = y)
k−1
2
) (
bj − I (u , y)
k−1
2
)
∆iv .
Then si = si,yi . To compute si,u for each value of u, use the recurrence:
sn,u = 0,
and
si,u = si+1,u + I (yi+1 , u)
1
ai+1 + bi+1 + 1
(
ai+1 + bi+1
k
)−1 (ai+1 − I (u = y)
k−1
2
) (
bi+1 − I (u , y)
k−1
2
)
∆iv .
To see that the recurrence holds, notice from the definition of si that si is just si+1 with one more
term in the sum – the term with j = i + 1. Using this recurrence, Shapley values for each out-of-
sample example can be computed for all in-sample examples in O(n) time. If we include time to
sort the examples in order of distance from x , then the time becomes O(n lgn)
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5.2 Owen Values for k-Nearest Neighbors
Assume thatC1, . . . ,Cm index the in-sample examples contributed bym coalitions to form the full
set of in-sample examples. We will present a method to compute the Owen value for in-sample
example i in coalition m (to make the notation simpler, and without loss of generality, since we
can renumber the coalitions) for the action taken based on k-nearest neighbor classification of an
out-of-sample input x with label y. To compute the Owen value for a coalition, sum the Owen
values over its examples.
Begin with the portion of the Owen values for the addition of example i changing the decision,
which corresponds to дi (x ,y). For each example j indexed by J , let qh,s,a,b be the probability over
permutations of the coalitions that s of the coalitions among C1, . . . ,Ch precede Cm and those
coalitions together contribute a examples indexed by Aj , b examples indexed by Bj and, if j < Cm ,
example j . Without loss of generality, if j < Cm then let j ∈ C1. (Renumber coalitions if needed.) If
j ∈ Cm then base cases are:
q0,0,0,0 = 1 and ∀(s,a,b) , (0, 0, 0) : q0,s,a,b = 0.
Let ah = |Aj ∩Ch |. Let bh = |Bj ∩Ch |. If j < Cm then base cases are:
q1,1,a1,b1 =
1
2
and ∀(s,a,b) , (1,a1,b1) : q1,s,a,b = 0.
For the recurrence:
Lemma 5.4.
qh,s,a,b =
s + 1
h + 1
qh−1,s−1,a−ah,b−bh +
h − s
h + 1
qh−1,s,a,b .
Proof. The recurrence is very similar to the one in Lemma 4.2. To prove it, just replace p by q
and j by h in the proof of Lemma 4.2. 
Lemma 5.5. Let
qa,b =
m−1∑
s=0
qm−1,s,a,b .
Let Jm = J ∩ Cm . Then the portion of the Owen value for in-sample example i changing the k-
nearest neighbor classification decision for out-of-sample input x with label y, given that example i
is contributed by coalition Cm , is:
дˆm,i (x ,y) =
∑
j∈J−Jm
∑
(a,b ) |a≤am,b≤bm
q k−1
2
−a, k−1
2
−b
1
am + bm + 1
(
am + bm
a + b
)−1 (
am
a
) (
bm
b
)
∆iv,
+
∑
j∈Jm
∑
(a,b ) |a≤am,b≤bm
q k−1
2
−a, k−1
2
−b )
1
am + bm + 2
(
am + bm + 1
a + b + 1
)−1 (
am
a
) (
bm
b
)
∆iv .
Proof. Together, the sums cover summation over J , ensuring that adding example i can change
the vote. In both sums, q k−1
2
−a, k−1
2
−b supplies the probability that coalitions beforeCm in the coali-
tion permutation supply k−12 −a examples fromAj and
k−1
2 −b from Bj . For the first sum, a previous
coalition supplies j , so Cm only needs to supply a of am and b of bm elements before element i in
the coalition Cm permutation in order to have a tied vote without j . By Lemma 3.1, only probabil-
ities over permutations of (Aj ∩Cm) ∪ (Bj ∩Cm) ∪ {i} need to be considered. By Lemma 3.2, the
probability thatCm contributions before example i create a tie without j is
1
am + bm + 1
(
am + bm
a + b
)−1 (
am
a
) (
bm
b
)
.
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For the second sum, j must come before i in the coalition Cm permutation, and a of am and b of
bm must also. By Lemma 3.1, only permutations of (Aj ∩Cm) ∪ (Bj ∩ Cm) ∪ {j} ∪ {i} need to be
considered. By Lemma 3.2, with S1 = Aj ∩Cm , S2 = Bj ∩Cm , and S3 = {j}, the probability thatCm
contributions before example i , not including j , create a tie, and j also precedes i , is
1
am + bm + 2
(
am + bm + 1
a + b + 1
)−1 (
am
a
) (
bm
b
) (
1
1
)
=
1
am + bm + 2
(
am + bm + 1
a + b + 1
)−1 (
am
a
) (
bm
b
)
.

Now consider the portion of the Owen value for an example i from Cm creating a classification
by being the kth example in the classifier. (This portion corresponds to fi (x ,y).) As before, let A
index the in-sample examples, excluding example i , that have label y. Let B index those that do
not have label y. Reuse some notation, with A and B in place of Aj and Bj : let
ah = |A ∩Ch |
and
bh = |B ∩Ch |.
Use these values to compute qh,s,a,b and qa,b using the formulas given previously. Then qa,b is
the probability over permutations of coalitions that the coalitions preceding Cm together have a
examples with label y and b without.
Lemma 5.6. Using these ah , bh and qa,b values, the portion of the Owen value for example i from
Cm creating a classification decision by being the kth example in a k-nn classifier is
fˆm,i (x ,y) =
∑
(a,b,a′,b ′) |a+b+a′+b ′=k−1 and a+a′+I (yi=y)< k2
qa,b
1
|Cm |
(
|Cm | − 1
a′ + b ′
)−1 (
am
a′
) (
bm
b ′
)
(vw − vn)
+
∑
(a,b,a′,b ′) |a+b+a′+b ′=k−1 and a+a′+I (yi=y)> k2
qa,b
1
|Cm |
(
|Cm | − 1
a′ + b ′
)−1 (
am
a′
) (
bm
b ′
)
(vc −vn).
Proof. In each term, a is the number of examples with label y, and b is the number without,
contributed by coalitions preceding Cm , and a′ and b ′ are the numbers of examples with and
without label y among examples inCm that precede example i in a permutation of the examples in
Cm . Both sums require k − 1 examples preceding example i by requiring a+b +a′+b ′ = k − 1. The
first sum requires incorrect classification (a + a′ + I (yi = y) <
k
2 ) and has value term vw −vn , for
the net value from no decision to an incorrect one. The second sum requires correct classification
(a + a′ + I (yi = y) >
k
2 ) and has value term vc −vn , for the net value of creating a correct decision
from no decision. In both, sums, qa,b is the probability that coalitions other than Cm contribute
a correct and b incorrect votes, 1
|Cm |
is the probability over permutations of examples in Cm that
example i is in position k − (a +b), making it the kth example in the classifier, and the other terms
are the probability that the (k − 1) − (a + b) = a′ + b ′ examples preceding example i are a′ with
correct labels and b ′ with incorrect labels. 
Theorem 5.7. The Owen value for example i in coalition Cm in the classification of out-of-sample
input x with label y is:
fˆm,i (x ,y) + дˆm,i (x ,y).
Proof. Combine Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6. 
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6 DISCUSSION
This paper provides methods to divide profits or losses from data among data providers. In the
future, it would be useful to expand the division of profits or losses to include the party or parties
that perform the analysis and take action based on it to realize a profit or loss. One possible ap-
proach is to include the analyzer and administrator as a participant or participants in the coalition
when computing Shapley or Owen values. Other, more prosaic, approaches include applying Shap-
ley or Owen values only to “excess” profits, perhaps as defined by an a priori agreement between
the data providers and an analyzer/administrator, for example having each user pay a fixed fee for
analysis and administration, then dividing the remaining profit or loss among the data providers
– similar to the fees paid to money managers in mutual funds. In such cases, the gain or loss from
a decision for the purposes of computing the data dividend should be limited to the portion of the
gain or loss that contributes to the excess profits only. Each decision’s contribution to the excess
profits could be computed using Shapley or Owen values.
In a competitive environment such as investing, making data available to multiple decision-
makers may decrease the value of the data to each. Conversely, if one organization can deny data
to others, it may gain a competitive advantage. It would be interesting to examine how such strate-
gic interests might influence valuation and payment for data. For example, how much should a
decision-maker value having exclusive access to data? Conversely, for some applications, data
may have decreasing marginal value for decision-making because a limited amount may allow
statistically significant estimates and then more data would be unlikely to change decisions. So
statistical sufficiency and competitive pressures may balance each other in determining prices for
data.
With payment for data comes an incentive to generate data that is false or duplicated, perhaps
with slight changes to avoid detection. So paying for data may prompt a need for data verification.
This is important not just to avoid over-paying those who contribute such data, but also to avoid
making suboptimal decisions because of it.
Finally, some people’s data may be more valuable than others’ to some organizations or for some
functions. For example, data about a person whose spending behavior is indicative of a larger
group’s may offer more useful insights on which products are having increased sales than data
about someone who has more unusual spending habits. However, there may be more people who
have common spending habits, making data about them less scarce. In either case, people who
are representative of groups who spend more seem likely to have more valuable data. As a result,
offering to pay for data based on its value may have the potential to increase inequality. (For more
on big data and inequality, refer to [28].)
Groups of people who are more protective of their privacy may contribute less data, and this
could be exacerbated by paying for data. To get a representative sample, it may be necessary to
pay people from those groups more for their data. This should help reduce some forms of bias in
the analysis of the data and in decisions based on it. (For more on bias and the web, refer to [6].)
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